ESP32 OTA Updates at Home: HTTPS Only, Signed, With a Way Back
ESP-IDF v6.1.1 makes esp_https_ota refuse plain HTTP by default. How to run ESP32 OTA updates at home: HTTPS, signed images, two slots and a rollback you test.

How do I make ESP32 OTA updates safe at home?
Serve the image over HTTPS that the device verifies, sign the app so each update is checked against the running app's key, keep two OTA slots with app rollback enabled, and test that a bad image falls back. On ESP-IDF v6.1.1, esp_https_ota refuses plain HTTP unless you enable it on purpose.
On November 16, 2026, Espressif tagged ESP-IDF v6.1.1, a bugfix release for the 6.1 line. Its security list opens with one line that matters to anyone updating boards over Wi-Fi: "esp_https_ota now rejects plain HTTP unless HTTP downloads are explicitly enabled." If a project of yours fetches firmware from an http:// address on a home server, its next ESP32 OTA update will fail once you rebuild it on v6.1.1. That failure is the fix working.
The same tag is the 6.1 release that the L2CAP and A2DP advisories named as their patch, so the Bluetooth home check from last week now has a tag to move to. This page is about the other half of that rebuild: how firmware reaches the board after it leaves your desk.
Nothing here was re-run on a board. It reads Espressif's v6.1.1 documentation and the house field notes and turns them into a checklist for over-the-air updates in a home.
What ESP-IDF v6.1.1 changes for ESP32 OTA updates
esp_https_ota is Espressif's simple API for firmware updates over HTTPS, a layer over the lower-level OTA functions. The v6.1.1 API reference spells out the new rule. Unless CONFIG_ESP_HTTPS_OTA_ALLOW_HTTP is enabled, an unset transport_type in the HTTP client config is set to HTTPS, so an http:// URL fails, and so does a redirect to one. Any other explicit transport type is rejected with ESP_ERR_INVALID_ARG. A custom transport is used as is, and its security is the application's job.
In practice there are three outcomes after a rebuild. A project that already used https:// with a verified certificate sees no change. A project that pointed at http:// stops updating until you serve the file over HTTPS or turn the option on. A project with its own transport is untouched, and still owns its own risk.
Do not reach for the option first. Plain HTTP means anything between the board and the server can swap the image, and on a home network that includes every device you never audited. The fix is a server the board can verify. The rest of an ESP32 OTA update is about what happens after the bytes arrive.
Three layers for a safe ESP32 OTA update
Transport, origin and recovery are separate questions. HTTPS answers the first, a signature the second, and a second slot with rollback the third.
Serve the ESP32 OTA image over HTTPS the board can verify
The API reference asks for the server's root certificate in cert_pem, and says to use the root rather than an intermediate, because the root stays valid longest. The alternative is the ESP x509 certificate bundle through crt_bundle_attach, which covers most public roots. For a server inside the house, that means giving it a certificate and baking the matching root into the firmware, not switching HTTPS off.
The same page documents partial downloads and resumption for slow links. Those change how the image travels, not whether the board trusts it.
Sign the image so the board knows who built it
HTTPS proves the board reached the right server. It does not prove the file on that server is yours. Espressif's signed app verification without hardware secure boot closes that gap for over-the-air updates: the running app's public key checks the signature of each new image before it is accepted. That builds a chain of trust from the first app, so the first app flashed must be signed too.
Espressif is candid about the limit. Without hardware Secure Boot, an attacker who can write to flash can bypass the check, and the docs recommend full Secure Boot unless you are sure the lighter mode fits your threat model. For a sensor on a shelf inside your home, the lighter mode may fit. Write that choice down.
Keep two slots and a rollback you have tested
The OTA reference requires at least two app slots, ota_0 and ota_1, plus an OTA data partition. A new image goes into the slot that is not running, so a power cut mid-download leaves the old app intact. With CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_APP_ROLLBACK_ENABLE, the new app boots in a pending state and must call esp_ota_mark_app_valid_cancel_rollback() after its own checks. If it resets first, the bootloader returns to the previous working app. Anti-rollback adds a security version in eFuse so an old, vulnerable image cannot be reinstalled.
A rollback you have never triggered is a hope. Build one image that skips the confirm call, send it, and watch the board come back. The power-cycle test has the bench routine for recording that kind of evidence honestly.
How ESP32 OTA updates work on the house Janus stack
The house devices take the same three layers and move them off the download URL entirely.
Updates over the mesh, not a download URL
Janus firmwares run on two tracks. Track A is std Rust on ESP-IDF, and that is where iroh and TLS live. Track B is no_std on esp-hal, used for smaller radio boards. On a board that runs iroh, updates do not come from a web server the board polls. They arrive over the household mesh carried by rusty_esp_iroh, which runs QUIC with pure-Rust TLS on the chip and keeps signed over-the-air updates on their own protocol. This page does not claim how a Track B board, or a board that reaches the mesh through a bridge, receives updates, and it does not claim the v6.1.1 change touches the mesh path. The change still matters for any of your own Track A projects that call Espressif's API.
What the house update path checks before it writes
The rusty_esp_mid field note lists the checks in order, all before one byte of the image is read: the caller is the owner, the device manifest declares the update capability, the maker is trusted, and the chip, model, size and maker's signature all match. Only then does the device write into the inactive slot, hashing as it goes. The same note is exact about evidence. On silicon, a maker-signed update committed into the other slot, booted and stayed after a hard reset. Refusing a bad signature and rolling back an unvalidated image are proven on the host so far, not yet as a silicon row.
Where to start with ESP32 OTA updates at home
First flash still happens over USB. espino builds, flashes and monitors the board from your desk, and the Flash vision shows where that loop sits. After that, ownership decides who may update the device: the update path answers only to the owner who adopted it. Adoption is also how a local device joins the household's home computer, explained on mata.network in how DLDeploy puts local ESP32 devices on MATA Home. The crates behind the mesh and the update path are published through Remade with Rust. Whatever stack you run, keep the same three layers: a transport the board verifies, an image it can prove is yours, and a slot to fall back to.
FAQ
Quick answers for builders evaluating this technology.
What changed for ESP32 OTA updates in ESP-IDF v6.1.1?
The v6.1.1 release notes, published November 16, 2026, list a security fix: esp_https_ota now rejects plain HTTP unless HTTP downloads are explicitly enabled. The API reference says an http:// URL or redirect target fails unless CONFIG_ESP_HTTPS_OTA_ALLOW_HTTP is set.
Is HTTPS enough to trust an ESP32 OTA update?
No. HTTPS shows the device reached the server it was told to trust and that the bytes were not changed in transit. It says nothing about who built the image. A signature checked on the device does, which is why Espressif documents signed app verification for OTA.
What happens if new ESP32 firmware never comes up after an OTA update?
With CONFIG_BOOTLOADER_APP_ROLLBACK_ENABLE set, a new app that resets before confirming itself is rolled back and the bootloader starts the previous working app. The new app confirms itself by calling esp_ota_mark_app_valid_cancel_rollback() after its own checks pass.
Do Janus devices use esp_https_ota for updates?
On Janus boards that run iroh, updates arrive over the household mesh through rusty_esp_iroh, not from a download URL, and the device checks owner, capability, maker, chip, model, size and signature before writing. This page does not claim the v6.1.1 change touches that path.
Should I enable CONFIG_ESP_HTTPS_OTA_ALLOW_HTTP for a home server?
Avoid it. Plain HTTP lets anything on the network path change the image before it reaches the board. Serve the file over HTTPS and give the device the server's root certificate in cert_pem, which keeps the v6.1.1 default doing its job.